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INTRODUCTION
A license to practice law is not a license to commit crime. When
an attorney uses his position to aid ban organized crime client in ongoing
criminal activity or in running a criminal enterprise, few would disa-
gree that government has the right, indeed the duty, to investigate and
prosecute that person to at least the same extent they would his princi-
pal.1 Law enforcement has the obligation not only to stop and punish
the criminal conduct at issue, but also to protect the integrity of the
criminal justice system itself.
Nonetheless, very real dangers may arise when law enforcement
officers investigate attorneys believed to be using their status as attor-
neys to commit or aid criminal wrongdoing, particularly when the in-
vestigative techniques used include the execution of search and elec-
tronic surveillance warrants. An intrusion into legitimate attorney-
client communications may occur. The knowledge that such investiga-
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1 The Report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime alleges that or-
ganized crime syndicates utilize "protectors"-which include attorneys, as well as
judges, politicians, and financial advisors,-and various support systems to operate ef-
fectively in modern society. See PRFSIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, RE-
PORT To THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPAcT: ORGANIZED
CRIME TODAY 29-32 (1986) (hereinafter "REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION"). Indeed, according to the Report "[tihe success of organized crime is dependent
upon this buffer [of protectors], which helps to protect the criminal group form [sic]
both civil and criminal action." Id. at 31. The Report thus implies that eliminating the
protectors and support systems will cause organized crime to crumble. While the cor-
rectness of this conclusion is highly questionable, and while it is too simplistic an an-
swer to the complex problem that organized crime represents, vigorous prosecution of
the "protectors," including the corrupt attorney, is clearly a reasonable component of a
comprehensive strategy of organized crime control.
(1855)
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tions occur may produce a chilling effect on attorney-client relation-
ships. An appearance of prosecutorial impropriety may arise that will
cast doubts on the motives and integrity of the prosecutor. Finally, an
adverse impact on the adversary process itself may result,2 thereby iron-
ically jeopardizing the existence of the very system that the investigators
seek to protect.3
Ultimately then, the issue is not whether attorneys should ever be
the subject of investigations, or whether their status as attorneys should
be completely ignored. Instead, the question is whether reasonable and
adequate safeguards can be designed and implemented to satisfy the
competing social interests that inevitably arise when a licensee of the
state is suspected of switching allegiance from the court to the mob.
Every step in the investigation, from the initial decision to investigate to
the decisions of whether and how to execute search warrants or conduct
electronic surveillance, must be the product of principled judgments.
Such judgments must be guided by the establishment of internal office
controls and circumscribed by legally mandated procedures.
What follows is an analysis of the issues and the principles that
should form the conceptual framework for the creation of these
prosecutorial controls and procedures. Part I will identify the potential
illicit roles corrupt attorneys may play in the organized crime area and
will more fully explore the dangers and concerns that arise when law
enforcement officers investigate such conduct. Part II then will examine
the means by which unintended and deleterious consequences of such
investigations may be reduced and controlled.
2 The danger always exists that investigations of suspects who are attorneys will
accidentally uncover legitimate attorney-client communications. Law enforcement of-
ficers, therefore, should exercise restraint and caution in any investigation that involves
an attorney and take appropriate and adequate measures to ensure that intrusions into
privileged matters will be minimized. But the likelihood that such intrusions might take
place, along with the concomitant dangers to the integrity of our adversary system,
increases when the suspect's status is integral to the crimes he is suspected of commit-
ting. This Article addresses the latter situation.
' Even those who agree with the proposed strategy of the President's Commission
on Organized Crime, which stresses the vigorous prosecution of attorneys who act as
"protectors" for organized crime, must recognize that, as the Commission itself ob-
served, "[slpecial care must be taken at each stage of an investigation involving lawyers
suspected of criminal activity" in order to reduce the "potential for abuse of such tactics
as use of undercover agents and introduction of phony cases into the judicial system in
order to detect corrupt lawyers and judges." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 272.
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I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Corrupt Attorney
Although the vast majority of attorneys are legitimate, some ac-
tively use their practice for criminal ends.' The President's Commission
on Organized Crime, for instance, concluded that a small but important
group of attorneys act as "protectors" for organized crime. Through
illegal activities and the use and abuse of "the influence and prestige of
their office," 5 these attorneys work to insulate members of their crimi-
nal group from effective civil and criminal prosecution.' According to
the Commission, this "protection" distinguishes organized crime from
other types of crime, making it a "particular threat to society."
7
In support of its proposition, the Commission sets forth in its final
report five case studies of "Mob-Connected" lawyers.' These studies
seek to illustrate how the criminal services that such corrupt attorneys
supply to organized crime tend to undermine the integrity of our crimi-
nal justice system. On behalf of clients who are the subject of prosecu-
tion, these attorneys have suborned perjury, helped intimidate wit-
nesses, and corrupted public officials, including judges, prosecutors, and
police officers.' In carrying out these activities, they often have taken
orders, not from their putative client-defendants, but from others far-
ther up in the hierarchy of the criminal organization; indeed, as one of
their obligations, they have attempted to identify defectors who seek to
cooperate with the authorities."0
When not actually assisting in their clients' defenses, these attor-
neys also used their legal expertise to help clients launder the proceeds
of their crimes,"1 counseled them on how best to conceal from the au-
thorities ongoing or contemplated criminal ventures, 2 and allowed
them to use their law offices as safe havens for illicit meetings to fur-
ther those ventures. The offices are used on the assumption that law
enforcement officials will be hesitant to subject the law office to physi-
' See id. at 221.
5 Id. at 31.
6 See id. at 29-31.
7 Id. at 30.
8 See id. at 221-49.
9 See id. at 221-22, 224, 228-29, 242-48.
10 See id. at 224. One mob-connected attorney would go to court when a member
of the criminal organization he was representing was arrested in order to see who was
representing the accused. If it was Legal Aid or a public defender, "'that would be a
tip-off that [the accused] might be cooperating.'" Id. at 225 (quoting former attorney
Martin Light).
" See id. at 232, 237.
12 See id. at 239.
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cal or electronic surveillance.' 3 Some attorneys have even engaged in
actual criminal activity such as conveying "hit" orders 4 and transport-
ing drugs.1
5
Nor do corrupt attorneys function only in conjunction with tradi-
tional organized crime groups. Attorneys have used their positions to
commit crimes, either for their own benefit or for that of their clients.
For example, in In re Sealed Case' attorneys for the Synanon Church
engaged in a massive and systematic destruction and alteration of docu-
ments sought pursuant to civil discovery requests,1 and in National
City Trading Corp. v. United States, 8 a lawyer permitted a criminal
business to operate out of his law office.' 9 These are, unfortunately, not
isolated cases.2°
B. No Prohibition to Investigating
Attorneys who commit these crimes and abuse their positions
should be investigated, prosecuted, and punished to whatever degree
might be appropriate. Their status as attorneys does not exempt them
from the responsibilities and duties of all other citizens, nor should it
protect them from the scrutiny of law enforcement officers.
Courts consistently have -held that, when the attorney himself is
the target of the investigation and is suspected of criminal wrongdoing,
intrusive investigative techniques may be employed, albeit with special
" See id. at 240.
14 See id. at 246-47.
16 See id. at 222.
16 754 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
17 See id. at 397.
s 635 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1980).
Is See id. at 1022.
20 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 467 (1976) (attorney charged
with crime of false pretenses and with fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary);
Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 957 (3d Cir. 1984) (attorney
allegedly conspired to use the United States mail to defraud insurance companies by
submitting fraudulent medical reports and inflated medical bills in personal injury ac-
tions); In re John Doe Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1982)
(corporate counsel allegedly attempted to bribe an administrative official); In re Doe,
662 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (attorney
allegedly advised client to lie during trial and to bribe witnesses and had attempted to
procure other false testimony); United States v. Loften, 507 F. Supp. 108, 110
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendant's attorney allegedly involved in defendant's drug traffick-
ing enterprise); Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215,
1217-18 (Colo. 1982) (attorney allegedly involved in forming sham corporations to de-
fraud the liquor licensing authority); People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 63, 436 N.E.2d
480, 485, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35 (1982) (attorney allegedly influenced the outcome of a
case for profit); People v. Salko, 47 N.Y.2d 230, 236, 391 N.E.2d 976, 980, 417
N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (1979) (attorney charged with crimes of bribery and bribing a
witness).
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care.21 Indeed, "the fact that a person is an attorney does not render
privileged everything he says or does, for or with a client," and there-
fore he may be subject to court authorized electronic surveillance.2"
Similarly, there is nothing per se unreasonable about searching a law
office, "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific items
sought are located on the property to be searched." 2
1. Privileges
The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work-product doctrine2 impose the main restraint on prosecu-
21 See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 483-84 (upholding seizure of attorney's business
records); Klitzman, 744 F.2d at 959 (search of law office not per se unreasonable); In
re Application of the United States for an Order, 723 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1983)
(allowing electronic surveillance of attorney's law offices during a grand jury investiga-
tion); National City Trading Corp., 635 F.2d at 1026 (allowing search because proba-
ble cause existed to believe attorney was violating the law).
When the attorney is not the target of the investigation, however, some courts
impose safeguards. See, e.g., Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253,
260-61, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (leaving open the question of
investigating documents of attorneys who have not been charged); O'Connor v. John-
son, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (holding that the search of an attorney's office
is unreasonable if she is not suspected of criminal activity and presents no threat of
destroying documents).
Moreover, various statutes and regulations stringently protect the attorney who is
not charged with wrongdoing. See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (1982)) (providing that it is
unlawful to search or seize work-product materials unless "there is probable cause to
believe that the person possessing such materials has committed or is committing the
criminal offense to which the materials relate" or "there is reason to believe that the
immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious
bodily injury to, a human being"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) & (0 (West 1982)
(providing that a search warrant for the work-product of any attorney suspected or not
charged is unlawful unless certain procedures are followed by investigators); OR. REv.
STAT. § 9.695(1) (2) (1987) ("[T]he files, papers, effects or work premises of a lawyer
relating to the provision of legal service by the lawyer shall not be subject to search or
seizure by any law enforcement officer, either by search warrant or otherwise[,]" unless
the lawyer has committed or is suspected of committing a crime.); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-5.1-4(c) (1956) (prohibiting investigators from intercepting lawyers' wire and oral
communications unless investigators demonstrate a "special need"); cf. Department of
Justice Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third
Parties, 28 C.F.R. § 59.1 (b) (1987) (generally advocating use of a subpoena, adminis-
trative summons or, government request rather than a search warrant to investigate a
disinterested third party).
22 Loften, 507 F. Supp. at 112.
23 National City Trading Corp., 635 F.2d at 1026; cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1978) (applying same standard to searches of property held by
third parties not implicated in criminal activity).
24 The work-product doctrine, while not a "privilege" in the evidentiary sense, is
nonetheless a "qualified privilege." Compare Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-
510 (1947) (subject matter of work-product was not "privileged or irrelevant, as those
concepts are used in [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]") with United States v.
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tors seeking to investigate attorneys. Because this privilege and doctrine
help ensure the proper functioning of our legal system and the adver-
sary process,25 courts have given them unique protection.26 They are
not, however, absolute, and the courts have held that neither the attor-
ney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine applies when either
is used as a "cloak" for illegal or fraudulent behavior.27
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest confidential communica-
tions privilege." It protects communications, written or oral, between a
client and attorney made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.29 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full disclo-
sure and "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients."30 The privilege is based on the premise that the advocate or
counselor must be fully informed by the client if the "public ends"
served by "sound legal advice or advocacy" are to be met." l Thus, the
privilege promotes the "broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.
'3 2
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975) (work-product doctrine amounts to a "qualified
privilege"). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 552-
54 (4th ed. 1983) (describing a lawyer's work-product as having "a qualified immunity
from discovery").
25 See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986); In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-809 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hodge &
Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GRO-
THEER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.60[2] (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter J. MOORE].
21 See Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir.
1984); see also 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2017 (1970) (discussing protection of the attorney-client privilege); Bloom,
The Law Office Search: An Emerging Problem and Some Suggested Solutions, 69
GEO. L.J. 1, 12-18 (1980) (discussing importance of attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine).
2'7 See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("The privilege takes
flight if the relation is abused."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[A]dvice in furtherance of [im-
proper] goals is socially perverse, and . . . not worthy of protection." (citations omit-
ted)); In re Application of the United States for an Order, 723 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st
Cir. 1983) ("[Cjommunications between attorney and client which concern illegal activ-
ities in progress are not protected by the [attorney-client] privilege." (citation omitted));
In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th
Cir. 1982) (crime-fraud exemption to privilege firmly entrenched in common law); In
re John Doe Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1982) (same).
28 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)).
29 See Klitzman, 744 F.2d at 960; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2291.
30 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
31 Id; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (attorney-client
privilege rooted in need for confidence and trust in order to fulfill "professional mis-
sion"); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (purpose of privilege is to
promote full disclosure). See generally Bloom, supra note 26, at 12-14 (discussing
function of attorney-client privilege).
32 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
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The work-product doctrine, although "closely related" to the at-
torney-client privilege, 33 is in fact "distinct from and broader than the
attorney-client privilege."' 34 It protects any material, confidential or not,
prepared by or for the attorney in anticipation of litigation. It upholds
the integrity of the adversary system by ensuring that lawyers can
"work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion
by opposing parties and their counsel."13 5 The work-product doctrine is
premised on the assumption that this type of privacy is "the historical
and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of
our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their cli-
ents' interests. '36 The doctrine is equally applicable in criminal and
civil cases,37 but it is not absolute: a showing of "substantial need" for
otherwise privileged materials can defeat an assertion of this doctrine's
protection."
s In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975) (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947)).
" Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11; see In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155,
163 (6th Cir. 1986); 4 J. MOORE, supra note 25, at § 26.64[3.-2].
38 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. For a thorough discussion of Hickman and its im-
pact on discovery, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, § 82, at 551-560.
17 See, e.g., Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236 (Court agreed that work-product doctrine
applies to criminal as well as civil cases, but found that it was inappropriate to apply it
to the criminal case in this instance); Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 810 (privilege for work-
product applicable to criminal discovery); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir.
1981) (work-product principle applies to civil trials, criminal trials, and grand jury
proceedings).
" The cases have distinguished between "opinion" work-product and mere fac-
tual work-product and have granted to the former greater, and at times near absolute,
protection. The two-tiered model of protection arises from a desire to balance the lib-
eral rules of discovery against the need for confidentiality of attorneys' work. See Hick-
man, 329 U.S. at 510-12; Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 163-64; Sealed Case, 676
F.2d at 809-810; Doe, 662 F.2d at 1078. While some courts will only rarely pierce
opinion work-product protection, other courts seem more willing to limit opinion work-
product protection in certain circumstances. Compare In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326,
336 (8th Cir. 1977) (opinion work-product discoverable only in "very rare and ex-
traordinary circumstances") and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943,
949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that notes on a telephone conversation "are so much a
product of the lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witness's actual words
that they are absolutely protected from disclosure") with Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981) (although holding in this instance that work-product based
on oral statements was protected, the Court noted that it was "not prepared at this
juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work product rule.") and
In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury II, 640 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1980) (prima facie
showing of fraud precludes invocation of the work-product doctrine) and In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (opinion work-product not
absolutely protected but subject to compelled disclosure for good cause).
Courts disagree, however, on whether some heightened protection should apply to
the opinion work-product of an attorney acting with criminal intent. Compare Doe, 662
F.2d at 1080 ("not only must the government make a prima facie showing of fraud, but
must show a greater need for the opinion work product material than was necessary in
19881
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2. The Crime or Fraud Exception
The attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doc-
trine serve to "encourage the proper functioning of the adversary sys-
tem."38 They do not further that end, however, when the attorney com-
municates with his client and generates materials for the purpose of
aiding criminal activity.4" When a client retains an attorney for illegal
ends, "the broader public interest in the administration of justice is be-
ing frustrated, not promoted." '41 Indeed, if the goal of an attorney-client
relationship is the commission of a crime, that relationship is funda-
mentally inconsistent with our system of justice.42
Recognizing this problem, courts have created the "crime or fraud
exceptions" to the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trine.43 The exceptions are warranted because, as the Second Circuit
explained, "[w]hereas confidentiality of communications and work
product facilitates the rendering of sound legal advice, advice in fur-
therance of a fraudulent or unlawful goal cannot be considered 'sound.'
Rather advice in furtherance of such goals is socially perverse, and the
client's communications seeking such advice are not worthy of protec-
tion."44 In short, "no privilege applies 'where the relation giving birth
order to obtain the fact work product material") with Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 812
n.74 ("[o]nce a sufficient showing of crime or fraud has been made, the privilege [of the
work-product doctrine] vanishes as to all material related to the ongoing violation").
3' Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 164.
40 See id.
41 United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983).
While legal advice about past crimes remains privileged, advice that furthers
either ongoing or future crimes is unprotected. See, e.g., United States v. Horvath, 731
F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984) ("attorney-client communications lose their privileged
character when the lawyer is consulted to further a continuing or contemplated crimi-
nal or fraudulent scheme, not solely with respect to past wrongdoing"); Special Sept.
1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d at 59 (same); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553
(8th Cir. 1980) (same); Murphy, 560 F.2d at 337 (same); Grieco v. Meachum, 533
F.2d 713, 718 n.4 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Cassesso v. Meachum, 429
U.S. 858 (1976); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(same).
" The crime-fraud exception applies to attorney-client communications. See, e.g.,
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (attorney-client privilege gives way if the
government makes a prima facie showing that the client consults the attorney for advice
that will serve him in commission of a continuing or future crime or fraud); Dyer, 722
F.2d at 177 (same); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.
1977) (same); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
It also applies to an attorney's work-product. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982) (work-product immunity gives way if there is probable cause
to believe that product was prepared as part of a scheme of ongoing criminality); Spe-
cial Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d at 63 (same); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 604 F.2d 798, 802-803 (3d Cir. 1979) (same). See generally Bloom, supra note
26, at 14-15 (discussing the crime-fraud exception).
"' In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983 (Marc Rich
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to it has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued.' ")45
C. Dangers and Concerns
Despite the nationwide alarm over subpoenas directed at attorneys
and search warrants granting access to their law offices," much of the
concern is dispelled when the attorney is the target of the investigation
or is suspected of criminal wrongdoing.47 Real dangers remain, how-
ever, even when prosecutors pursue allegedly corrupt attorneys. An at-
torney subject to an investigation may in fact be innocent of any crimi-
nal wrongdoing. Law enforcement agencies are far from infallible.
Indeed, the probable cause standard normally associated with the au-
thority to search and seize allows for more than the possibility of
error.
48
Alternatively, a corrupt attorney under investigation may give le-
gitimate privileged legal advice to either organized crime clients or to
third parties, innocent or otherwise. Thus, although the law does not
protect conversations with clients and work-product in furtherance of
ongoing crimes, it does protect the rest, to whatever extent it exists. As
a California appellate court has explained, "[a]n attorney suspected of
criminal activity should have the same concerns about the confidential-
ity of files containing privileged matter as an innocent third party attor-
ney who allegedly possesses and controls files containing evidence of
criminal conduct."
49
Intrusions into privileged matters may occur in a number of ways,
from accidental and unintentional to reckless and intentional. Officers
executing a search warrant may examine or seize privileged documents
before the privileged nature of the document is ascertained5 0 Similarly,
& Co. v. United States), 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
"I Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 812 (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14
(1933)); see also Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1355 ("[A] quid pro quo is exacted for
the attorney-client confidence: the client must not abuse the confidential relation by
using it to further a fraudulent or criminal scheme ... .
48 See Bloom, supra note 26, at 18-25.
47 See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974); United States v.
Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Costello, 610 F.
Supp. 1450, 1464-68 (N.D. I1. 1985), affd without opinion sub nom. United States v.
Olson, 830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 708 (1988).
48 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (probable cause
standard contemplates mistakes by police officers, but "the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men").
"' Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 260, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857,
862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
50 See United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 548 (1st Cir. 1980) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) (Some files may contain "a jumble of 'innocent' as well as 'guilty' materi-
als."); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Minn. 1979) (A search of law
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officers monitoring a wiretap or "bug" may overhear privileged conver-
sations before they realize that the conversation is in fact privileged."'
These unintentional intrusions may be the result of the conceptual dis-
tinction between search and seizure or the inexact nature of the process
of minimization.52 They also may be the consequence of sloppy mini-
mization procedures, the lack of other adequate safeguards in the exe-
cution of the search, inadequate training of the officers executing the
search or monitoring the electronic surveillance, or a search that in its
very conception was overbroad.
53
On the other hand, unwarranted searches may occur because the
prosecutor is insensitive to the sanctity of the attorney-client relation-
ship, or because the prosecutor fails to comprehend either the complex-
ity of the issues involved or the ramifications of his actions. In some
cases, overreaching may be the product of a vindictiveness or the inten-
tional abuse of the powers of the prosecutor's office. A prosecutor
(hopefully a rare one) may target a defense attorney whose vigorous
defense of a client in the past embarrassed the prosecutor, or resulted in
an undesirable appellate ruling.
Even the appearance of such impropriety can injure the prosecu-
tor's reputation and the apparent fairness of the legal system. Sugges-
tions of overreaching investigations will cast doubt on a prosecutor's
judgment, motives and integrity. A prosecutor's ability to carry out ef-
fectively the duties and responsibilities of his office depends in large
part on his reputation within the legal profession and with the judges
before whom he must regularly appear. When that reputation is ques-
tioned, the ability to function with the necessary degree of trust or con-
fidence from the courts becomes impaired."' In addition, the confidence
office "of necessity involves a general and exploratory search of all of the attorney's
files.").
5 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 recog-
nizes that some privileged matter will be overheard. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (privileged information that is intercepted remains privileged).
52 Minimization is the procedure by which the warrant is executed so as to mini-
mize intrusions into protected materials. See infra notes 103-110 and accompanying
text.
53 Compare Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 958, 960 (3d
Cir. 1984) (warrant overbroad in that it allowed for a search of attorney's files, finan-
cial records, file lists, and appointment books with no specifications as to relevant issues
or individuals involved) and Abrams, 615 F.2d at 544-45 (warrant to search doctor's
office "amorphously worded so as to result in an indiscriminate seizure of relevant and
nonrelevant material"; search could have been more specific) with Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463, 484 (1976) (search warrant covered only documents pertaining to
parcel of land at issue; all other documents suppressed or returned to law offices) and
National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1022-24 (2d Cir. 1980)
(detailed warrant and memorandum given to agents who searched attorney's office).
" Arguably, the experience of Maurice H. Nadjari, Special State Prosecutor for
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of the public in both the fair operation of the office and the adversary
system is also shaken.
Possibly the most damaging and immediate effect of an intrusion
into privileged materials-or of the fear that such an intrusion may
occur-is the potential chilling effect it can cast on the attorney-client
relationship and the adversary system. Discussions between an attorney
and client may become less than frank and open if either the attorney
or client fears that their confidential communications may be subject to
future disclosure. If a client believes that "damaging information" will
be more easily obtained from his attorney than from himself, then, in
the words of the Supreme Court, "the client would be reluctant to con-
fide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed
legal advice."
'55
There is a similar potential chilling effect on an attorney's genera-
tion of work-product in connection with the representation of clients.
An attorney litigating against the government, or dealing with clients
who might be subject to criminal prosecution, may become reluctant to
commit legal and factual analysis to writing.56 As a result, "much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. . . . The
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served."' 5
Intrusions into the attorney-client relationship may thus weaken
the adversary system and even result in a violation of a client's sixth
amendment right to counsel.58
IL SAFEGUARDS IN AN INVESTIGATION
The federal eavesdropping statute may provide guidance in devel-
the New York City Criminal Justice System from 1972-76, effectively illustrates these
assertions. Following a number of early successes, Nadjari's office was accused of being
overzealous and insensitive to defendants' constitutional rights, which resulted in a
stunning string of dismissals, convictions overturned on appeal, and, ultimately, the end
of Nadjari's otherwise respected prosecutorial career-one that had spanned over two
decades.
5 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
56 See Bloom, supra note 26, at 22.
17 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
'1 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306-307 (1966) (discussing Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) and Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1953)); Bloom, supra note 26, at 16-18; cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 555-59 (1977) (using a sixth amendment right to counsel analysis to reject a
per se rule that would forbid an undercover agent from meeting with defendant's coun-
sel); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 345 (1967) (per curiam) (conviction over-
turned because wiretaps included conversations between attorney and client); Black v.
United States, 385 U.S. 26, 29 (1966) (per curiam) (defendant had right to new trial to
protect himself from "otherwise inadmissible" evidence obtained through wiretap).
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oping policies and procedures that will allow for effective investigation
and prosecution of corrupt attorneys, while minimizing the dangers and
risks outlined above.59 Indeed, "minimization" - a practice by which
officers executing eavesdropping warrants seek to avoid the interception
of non-authorized conversations - has become one of the central and
best known features of the statute. The usefulness of the analogy
should not be surprising: in formulating the conceptual framework for
the eavesdropping statute, Congress dealt with similar issues. On the
one hand, it recognized that electronic surveillance was an "indispensa-
ble aid" to the successful investigation and prosecution of organized
crime.60 On the other hand, such surveillance not only constituted a
gross invasion of privacy61 but also had the potential to infringe upon
basic constitutional freedom. 62 Congress therefore authorized use of
such an investigative technique only when the process of authorization
and execution contained safeguards that would reduce the likelihood of
undesirable governmental intrusions.63 The eavesdropping statute thus
provides that: (1) a high level, identifiable public official who would be
responsible and accountable for the eavesdropping undertaken make the
decision to apply for court-authorized eavesdropping;6 (2) the appli-
cant for a warrant make detailed, particularized showings in support of
the warrant application; 65 (3) the applicant exhaust normal investiga-
tive procedures; 6 and (4) the surveillance minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception."
Analogous safeguards can and should be established for investiga-
"' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
60 See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510) (1968).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. I; H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEO-
PLE 6 (1977) ("Electronic surveillance... strikes deeply and... often quite deliberately
at basic First Amendment rights to dissent and to associate.").
63 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2113, 2153 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967) (striking down a New York eaves-
dropping statute as too broad and without adequate safeguards, in violation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments).
6' See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); SENATE REPORT,
supra note 63, at 96-97, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2185.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 63 at 101, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at'2189-90.
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982); SENATE REPORT, supra note 63 at 101,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2190.
6" See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 63 at 103, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2192.
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tions of attorneys suspected of criminal wrongdoing. At the very least,
the policies and concerns underlying the federal eavesdropping statute
should serve as guideposts in formulating the safeguards that are ulti-
mately instituted.
A. Centralize the Decision to Investigate
First, any decision to initiate an investigation into the suspected
criminal activities of an attorney should be subject to a formal, central-
ized review by a high level official within the prosecutor's office. As
with eavesdropping, such centralization of responsibility arguably is the
most important safeguard against abuse, as it ensures that "[slhould
abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable per-
son."'6 8 Although the Final Report of the President's Commission on
Organized Crime urged vigorous investigation and prosecution of cor-
rupt attorneys,69 it also recognized that the "[ilnitial authorization of an
investigation should be subject to review at a high level of official re-
sponsibility. '7 0 Centralized oversight not only promotes accountability,
but also helps to avoid the appearance of impropriety or vindictiveness
by prosecutors. Mandatory review procedures force a prosecutor to
stop, consider, and discuss with colleagues and superiors the implica-
tions of investigating an attorney suspected of criminal wrongdoing.
Such procedures help impress upon the collective conscience of the
prosecutors' office the sensitivity of investigating attorneys and potential
adversaries.
In addition, as part of the review procedure, the prosecutor's office
should authorize an investigation only if there are specific and objective
indicia of attorney misconduct. Any decision to investigate an attorney
must be based on the recognition that society has given the attorney-
client relationship a special status and protection.7 While rumor or
unsupported suspicion of wrongdoing might generally be sufficient to
open a preliminary inquiry, more should be required when an attorney
is the proposed target. Although there need not be a showing amount-
ing to probable cause that the attorney is engaged in other than lawful
behavior, there should be "reasonable suspicion," which is more than
08 SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 96-97, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2185.
"' "[Law enforcement authorities should initiate investigations of attorneys in-
volved in organized crime with the same deliberation and commitment shown with any
other person suspected of serious wrongdoing." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION, supra note 1, at 258.
10 Id. at 272.
" See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' "72 One com-
mentator has defined such "reasonable suspicion" as "reasonable
grounds to suspect criminal conduct or arguably, a reasonable possibil-
ity [thereof]."' 78 In whatever manner the standard is articulated, 4 pros-
ecutors should require a special showing of potential wrongdoing when
the subject of their investigation is an attorney.
This is not to say that attorneys should be given preferential treat-
ment by prosecutors. Indeed, given the need to ensure the integrity of
the profession, the opposite might well be true. What is critical, how-
ever, is that law enforcement officers recognize the almost inevitable
risks attending such investigations and the need to proceed in a cautious
and thoughtful manner. 5
B. Exhaust Less Intrusive Techniques First
Next, the determination of how to conduct the authorized investi-
gation requires the development of an investigative plan. 6 To the ex-
tent possible, this plan should provide for the use of investigative tech-
niques that are least likely to intrude on privileged matters.7 For
example, while the use of pen registers might reveal the identity of an
attorney's clients, that information normally is not privileged;7 8 there-
fore, their use results in little, if any, intrusion into any privacy inter-
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
73 Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Physiological Bases for Stan-
dards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1987).
74 It has been suggested that there should be a sliding scale of suspicion, with
levels of suspicion greater than reasonable suspicion, but less than probable cause.
Whatever superficial appeal this suggestion might have, it has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985);
see generally Clermont, supra note 73, at 1124.
7. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (setting out the comprehensive
procedure to be followed, in general, for interception of wire, oral, and electronic com-
munications in order to insure such methods are used only when necessary, and in the
least intrusive means possible).
76 Such a plan, which law enforcement officers should prepare for any complex
investigation, should set forth the specific tactical measures to be implemented in a
general, yet realistic, manner that takes into consideration the goals to be attained. The
plan should discuss alternatives, identify legal issues that might arise during the course
of the investigation, and provide for periodic modification of the plan as circumstances
dictate. See G. Blakey, R. Goldstock & C. Rogovin, Rackets Bureaus: Investigation and
Prosecution of Organized Crime 49-51 (Cornell Institute on Organized Crime 1978).
7 See In re Witness-Attorney Before Grand Jury No. 83-1, 613 F. Supp. 394,
398 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
78 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1982); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 640 F. Supp. 1047, 1048-49 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); In re
Witness Attorney, 613 F. Supp. at 398-99.
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est." When, however, more intrusive investigative methods, such as
search warrants and eavesdropping are required, s" such techniques
must be carefully analyzed in advance and incorporated into the plan."
Federal law requires that, before a judge issues an eavesdropping
warrant, the application for that warrant demonstrate that prosecutors
have tried "normal" investigative techniques or found such techniques
to be too dangerous, or futile.8 2 Although eavesdropping need not be an
absolute "last resort"-with all other available investigative techniques
having been employed, no matter how futile, counterproductive, or dan-
gerous-law enforcement officers must not routinely use eavesdropping
as an initial step.8" While it has become de rigueur and perhaps self-
defeating to add this exhaustion requirement to other investigative tech-
niques, such as video surveillance,84 prosecutors investigating attorneys
should attempt to apply the spirit of this requirement throughout their
investigations. In addition, a judge should require that, within applica-
tions for search warrants targeting law offices or professional papers,
and applications seeking authorization for the electronic surveillance of
11 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (installation of a pen
register to record telephone numbers dialed did not violate the fourth amendment, since
the phone numbers were voluntarily conveyed to the telephone company when the
phone was used, thus defeating any legitimate expectation of privacy.).
so The use of these techniques often cannot be avoided, despite their inherent dan-
gers. Indeed, their use is a necessity in many cases, for it is through their use that law
enforcement officers are able to penetrate the secret operations of organized crime. See
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 211 (1968); SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at
89, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2177. For this very
reason the Final Report of the President's Commission recommends the aggressive use
of electronic surveillance against mob-connected attorneys. See REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 259. As the report points out, the wrongdoing of
these attorneys is "surreptitious." Id. at 258. To a great degree, the lawyers rely on the
cloak of privacy provided by their status as attorneys and by the attorney-client rela-
tionship in an attempt to thwart law enforcement efforts. See id. at 272. By penetrating
that cloak, however, electronic surveillance, and to a lesser degree the use of search
warrants, takes "away from organized crime the safe havens of the lawyer's office and
. . . telephone." Id. at 274. Without such techniques, as the Commission notes, "the
attorney-client privilege would be an impenetrable shield protecting lawyers who en-
gage in [a] wide variety of criminal actions." Id. at 272.
"I This should include not only careful and demanding review by any judge who
issues a search warrant or eavesdropping warrant, but also a careful and demanding
review within the prosecutor's office in preparing the applications for such warrants.
See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 274-75.
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982).
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (3)(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974); United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231-
32 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Costello, 610 F.Supp. 1450, 1464-68 (N.D. Ill.
1985), affd without opinion sub nom. United States v. Olson, 830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 708 (1988).
84 See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The
courts that have addressed this issue analyze a request for video surveillance under the
statute permitting electronic aural surveillance . . ").
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law offices, prosecutors show that they have used, or have reasonably
rejected as futile or counterproductive, other investigative techniques or
less intrusive searches or eavesdropping.
The risk and potential dangers of an unjustified intrusion into
privileged matters will increase as the focus of the investigation moves
closer to the attorney's law office. Indeed, within that office there pre-
sumably will be the greatest concentration of potentially privileged mat-
ters. For instance, if an investigation begins with search warrants di-
rected against, or electronic surveillance of, a non-attorney target, the
possibility of uncovering privileged matters exists, but is not particu-
larly great. Obviously, out of all the monitored conversations involving
the non-attorney target, only those between the target and attorney in-
volve the risk of investigators overhearing privileged matters. Their
conversations may range from discussions about purely business matters
or about ongoing criminal ventures, neither of which would be privi-
leged, to legitimate legal advice about a pending charge against the cli-
ent. Normal minimization rules can easily ensure that interceptions of
privileged conversations are infrequent.
The risk of intrusions into privileged materials increases, however,
and the task of minimization becomes more difficult, if prosecutors tap
the non-office or home telephone of the attorney. Potentially, a far
larger number of conversations over that telephone may concern privi-
leged matters. If the investigation then moves to the stage where the
attorney's law office is searched, or his office phones are tapped, the
potential for intercepting privileged matters increases even
more-assuming of course that the attorney's practice, or that of his
partners, is to some degree legitimate. In this situation, the job of law
enforcement officers becomes more complicated, as their efforts may ad-
versely affect the rights of legitimate, non-criminal clients or the prac-
tice of incorrupt legal partners in the same office. And, of course, the
possibility still exists that the officers will intercept privileged commu-
nications between the targeted client and attorney.
Thus, investigators should consider pursuing some less intrusive
use of these more intrusive investigative techniques after exhausting
normal investigative techniques, and before turning to electronic sur-
veillance or searches of law offices. If feasible, they should tap non-
attorney phones first, then the attorney's phone, and finally, and only
after other avenues have been exhausted, the phones of a law office
itself. Similarly, with regard to search warrants, investigators should
subject the law office or professional files of the attorney to searches
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only after other alternatives have been considered, tried, or rejected.85
C. Require Exacting Review of the Warrant Process
Prosecutors seeking to conduct a search of a law office or employ
electronic surveillance against an attorney should also find that court
review of their applications is more exacting than it is when a warrant
targeting a non-attorney is involved. Although the standard for proba-
ble cause to issue a warrant does not change depending on the scope or
nature of the search to be conducted,86 courts do review more carefully
85 While use of a subpoena may be a less intrusive alternative to the use of either
electronic surveillance or search warrants, a subpoena used against a target often proves
unworkable, including when the target is an attorney. See Law Offices of Bernard D.
Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1225-26, 1226 n.1 (Colo. 1982) (Quinn, J.,
specially concurring) (asserting that a per se rule favoring use of a subpoena as opposed
to a search warrant for the office of a lawyer not suspected of criminal wrongdoing
risks the loss or destruction of potential evidence); Department of Justice Guidelines on
Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties, 28 C.F.R.
§ 59.4 (1987) (In evaluating the viability of using a subpoena instead of a search war-
rant, a factor to consider is "[w]hether it appears that the use of a subpoena. . . would
be likely to result in the destruction, alteration, concealment, or transfer of the materi-
als sought" from the target.). But see In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080-81 (4th Cir.
1981) (Where the government could not proceed in its prima facie criminal case against
an attorney without evidence contained in the attorney's work-product-and the infor-
mation could not be obtained elsewhere-"the principles of the work product rule are
not served by declining to compel release of these documents" by subpoena.), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
Professor Bloom argues that a "subpoena preference rule" could promote various
goals:
Doubtlessly law enforcement officials will have a continuing and le-
gitimate need to gain access to information and criminal evidence pos-
sessed by attorneys. In most cases, this need can be satisfied without dam-
aging the attorney-client relationship if the police serve the attorney with a
subpoena, whether or not legally required. Such an approach would prob-
ably have a less inhibiting effect on client communications and attorney
trial preparation than any possible adjustment to search and seizure proce-
dure. Moreover, quite apart from any direct threat to the privileges, pro-
ceeding by subpoena is desirable because its operative premise-that the
professional integrity of the bar can be relied upon-should be en-
couraged. In view of the bar's present efforts to reconcile its duties to the
client with its obligations to the administration of justice and society, ac-
knowledging that the attorney is an ethical and conscientious professional
has more than symbolic value.
Bloom, supra note 26, at 100. This notion of the "ethical" attorney, while most likely
accurate in describing the majority of attorneys, breaks down in those instances where
corrupt attorneys are involved, as highlighted in the final report of the President's
Commission on organized crime. See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text. More-
over, Professor Bloom himself notes that alternatives to subpoenas are available: "Even
if the subpoena preference rule is rejected, the competing interests still might be recon-
ciled, though not quite as effectively, by adjusting search and seizure procedures."
Bloom, supra note 26, at 100.
"' See United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
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warrant applications seeking authorization for particularly intrusive
searches. Courts are often less rigorous, for instance, in their examina-
tion of applications for routine search warrants, which are often drafted
by non-lawyers who "should not be hobbled by technical rules,"87 than
they are of applications for eavesdropping warrants, which are highly
intrusive of privacy rights; eavesdropping applications must therefore
meet "precise and rigorous standard[s]" in order to justify the
intrusion.88
As the Supreme Court has noted, "'[a] seizure reasonable as to
one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different
setting or with respect to another type of material.' "89 Thus, for exam-
ple, when materials sought in a search might "be protected by the First
Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be ap-
plied with 'scrupulous exactitude.' "90 Similarly, privileged communica-
tions or materials, such as those protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work-product doctrine, carry with them an "enhanced"
expectation of privacy.91 Given this status, their seizure should be sub-
jected to the same exacting fourth amendment review.92
Such review will necessarily focus on two areas: first, whether the
warrant described with sufficient particularity the documehits or con-
versations to be seized; and second, whether the warrant was executed
so as to minimize intrusions upon privileged matters.
U.S. 931 (1978) ("This standard of probable cause is the same as the standard for a
regular search warrant."); United States v. Mutulu Shakur, Nos. SSS 82 Cr. 312-
CSH, 84 Cr. 220-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
("The same standard of probable cause applies to applications for authorization to con-
duct electronic surveillance as to traditional search warrants."); United States v.
Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1522 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("Courts have applied the standards
used to evaluate probable cause for traditional search warrants to electronic surveillance
applications.").
87 People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d
618, 624 (1985); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36 (1983); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-109 (1965).
" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result).
89 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Roaden v. Ken-
tucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973)).
" Id. (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
91 See DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1507 (9th Cir. 1985); Law Offices of
Bernard D. Morely v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo. 1982).
92 An application for a search warrant targeting a law office must be drafted,
therefore, with the same care with which an application for eavesdropping is drafted,
and with special attention paid to many of the same concerns. An attorney, and not a
police officer involved in the heat of the investigation, should prepare the application.
The attorney must consider and detail such things as the scope of the search, the neces-
sity for that search, whether other, less intrusive techniques have been exhausted, and
exactly what procedures will be employed to minimize unnecessary intrusions. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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1. Particularity
The fourth amendment specifies that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." 93 The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he requirement
that warrants shall particularly describe" the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. '94 The greater the particu-
larity of the description of the articles to be seized, the less likely that
the executing officers will examine papers or intercept conversations
unrelated to the legitimate scope of the warrant. Overbroad searches
are, perhaps, the primary danger to be avoided when officers investi-
gate attorneys, for it is these searches that will result in improper intru-
sions into privileged matters.
In executing search warrants, there is always the risk that inno-
cent documents Will be intercepted along with non-privileged ones, or
that in the initial review of documents, privileged matters will be re-
vealed.95 An exacting degree of specificity in the warrant as to the types
of documents to be seized will help to reduce this risk. Those courts
that have reviewed law office searches are unanimous in holding that,
because of the nature of the intrusion into possibly privileged matters,
these searches must be "precisely limited and restricted,"9 and that
reviewing courts must "scrutinize carefully the particularity and
breadth of the warrant authorizing the search, the nature and scope of
the search, and any resulting seizure." 97 Despite the fact that "'[there
is no special sanctity in papers . . . to render them immune from
search and seizure,' "98 there are nonetheless "grave dangers" inherent
in conducting a search of papers.99
93 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); See Stanford, 379 U.S. at
485; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
15 Cf United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1980) (expressing
concern over interception of innocent documents within a doctors' office).
96 Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo.
1982).
" Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 959 (3d Cir. 1984);
see National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1980);
cf. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980) (In a case involving doctors' records, the
court held that the "usual method" of obtaining voluminous business records is by sub-
poena; the government's "only alternative to this procedure . . . is strict compliance
with the fourth amendment's requirement of a particularized warrant.").
98 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 474 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
309 (1921)).
" Id. at 482 n.11; see National City Trading Corp., 635 F.2d at 1026.
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Thus, the warrant "should describe the material sought with a
heightened degree of particularity commensurate with information
known to the officer at the time the warrant is sought.""' The types of
documents to be seized should be limited by specifying caption, title,
author, recipient, time period, date, or some other identifying character-
istics that will limit the scope of the search in a meaningful way. Only
when "defining" information is unknown, or is absent from the papers,
"should resort be had to such generic descriptions as 'real estate
records' or 'income tax records' and, in these instances, the records
must be expressly confined to a specified person and transaction." '
A similar heightened attention to the fourth amendment's particu-
larity requirement should also be present when drafting an eavesdrop-
ping warrant. The application for the warrant must, of course, estab-
lish that there is probable cause to believe that a crime is or will be
committed and that incriminating conversations will be made over the
specified telephone line. 10 2 In addition, however, when an attorney's
telephone will be tapped, the warrant itself should identify, with
heightened specificity, whenever possible, the persons with whom the
attorney is expected to have incriminating conversations, and what the
expected subjects of the conversations might be. Such specificity, stand-
ing alone, will help to narrow the scope of the warrant and limit un-
warranted interceptions of conversations with innocent third parties or
about irrelevant, but privileged, subject matters.
2. Minimization
A warrant, drafted in conformity with the exacting demands of the
fourth amendment, must be executed in a similarly careful manner.
The Supreme Court has noted that "responsible officials, including ju-
dicial officials, must take care to assure that [searches] are conducted in
a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." 10 3 In-
deed, all eavesdropping, constitutionally and by statute, must be con-
ducted in a manner so as to minimize such intrusions.10 4 Minimization,
however, while perhaps being the most crucial safeguard, is also often
100 MacFarlane, 647 P.2d at 1226 (Quinn, J., specially concurring).
101 Id. at 1227 (Quinn, J., specially concurring); cf. Abrams, 615 F.2d at 544-45
(involving search of doctors' files); In re Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610
F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1979) (involving investigation of a business that operated a voca-
tional home-study school).
102 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), (b), (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
... Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
' See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y. 2d
245, 249, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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the most problematic.10 5 An important prophylactic measure in this re-
gard is to provide the executing officers with clear, well thought out,
and written minimization guidelines. °6 Such guidelines must be suffi-
ciently specific, and workable, so as to effectively limit the executing
officers' discretion to the narrow and particularized scope of the war-
rant itself.
In particular, the guidelines for a search warrant should specify
some sort of graded or limited review of seized or intercepted materials.
Once in the government's possession, the papers should be sealed pend-
ing an in camera review by the issuing judge to determine whether the
seized documents are privileged. As one jurist has suggested:
If the papers sought are readily identifiable by a cursory ex-
amination of an outside folder or container, the warrant
should require the executing officer to seize and seal the pa-
pers once located without any further examination of their
contents. On the other hand, if the papers sought cannot be
identified without examining their contents or the contents of
other documents, the warrant should restrict the executing
officer to such examination only as necessary to properly
identify the papers as within the scope of the warrant and,
when so identified, the warrant should require the officer to
seize and seal the documents.
07
Such limited examination followed by a sealing and an in camera re-
view by the court will potentially increase the number of documents
initially seized, but will drastically reduce the risk of unnecessary intru-
sions into privileged matters.'0 8
In executing eavesdropping warrants, however, a sealing is not a
viable alternative. The courts must rely on the integrity and intelligence
of well-trained monitoring officers, reinforced by clear minimization
guidelines that reflect a warrant narrow and particularized in concep-
105 See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11.
10I See In re Application of the United States for an Order, 723 F.2d 1022, 1027
(1st Cir. 1983); National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1026
(2d cir. 1980); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 544 (1st Cir. 1980); Law Of-
fices of Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1226-27 (Colo. 1982)
(Quinn, J., specially concurring).
107 MacFarlane, 647 P.2d at 1227 (Quinn, J., specially concurring).
108 The risk can be reduced further if the attorney is present and can hand over
files within the scope of the warrant, but which contain alleged privileged matters, for
immediate sealing, pending an in camera review by the issuing judge. However, the
attorney must do so without allowing the executing officers to review the files. See
National City Trading Corp., 635 F.2d at 1026.
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tion and scope.1 0 9 Following any such monitoring, the court should con-
duct an exacting judicial review of the procedures employed. Nonethe-
less, if there will be a substantial amount of unavoidable interceptions
of privileged materials, the prosecutor's office might want to consider a
centralized review of possibly privileged materials, so as to limit any
dissemination of those materials to other law enforcement officials. For
example, the report of President's Commission cited a case in which the
attorney in charge of the investigation was the only person to review
such conversations. 110
CONCLUSION
Self-regulation by law enforcement officers is of primary impor-
tance in safeguarding privileged communications. It helps eliminate im-
proper or overbroad investigations of attorneys and diminishes the ac-
tual number of intrusions into privileged matters. If such self-
regulation is based on established central procedures, reflecting a sensi-
tivity to the dangers involved and to the importance of avoiding these
dangers, it will also reduce the fear, both within and without the legal
profession, that improper or overreaching investigative intrusions may
take place. Self-regulation accomplishes this by inspiring a justified
confidence in the restraint of the prosecutor's office.
National City Trading Corp. v. United States is a vivid example
of prosecutorial restraint."" In this case, the government exercised
great "care" in executing a search warrant on a law office, and utilized
some of the safeguards discussed in this Article. As a result, the Second
Circuit noted "with approval" that "[s]uch self-regulatory care is con-
duct highly becoming of the Government; some would suggest that
these police-made rules go to the heart of the Fourth Amendment. It
surely is no way harmful to the Government's position here." '
While restraint on the part of prosecutors based on objective inter-
nal procedures is crucial, the judiciary also must fulfill its role in the
regulatory process. The courts must provide meaningful judicial over-
sight and strict judicial review of the most intrusive investigative tech-
niques. Thus, such oversight and review must focus on the issuance and
109 See United States v. Armocide, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir. 1975) (The govern-
ment must show that "a good faith effort to minimize" the interception of non-pertinent
communications was attempted.) cf. People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 249-50, 360 N.E.
2d 935, 940-41, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262, (1976) (The state must show that "procedures
were established to minimize interception of non-pertinent communications and that a
conscientious effort was made to follow such procedures.").
110 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 274.
"1 635 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. Id. at 1026-27 (citations omitted).
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execution of search warrants targeting law offices and attorneys' pa-
pers, as well as on electronic surveillance warrants of attorneys.
There will always be the risk that overreaching or overbroad in-
vestigations will create a chilling effect on the attorney-client relation-
ship. But there is also a real and compelling need to ferret out and
prosecute corrupt attorneys. They simply cannot be given immunity
from prosecution. Indeed, without fervent, yet controlled, prosecutorial
activity, these attorneys will continue to act as unassailable black
knights for organized crime, doing its bidding in furtherance of its ille-
gal schemes. Creative solutions are required to strike a fair and proper
balance between the government's needs and those of the attorney-client
relationship. Such solutions do exist, and need only to be implemented
by prosecutors and courts.

